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Abstract
The authors compare the efﬁciency of Canada’s largest banks with U.S. commercial banks over
the past 20 years. Efﬁciency is measured in three ways. First, the authors study key performance
ratios, and ﬁnd that Canadian banks are as productive as U.S. banks. Second, they investigate
whether there are economies of scale in the production functions of Canadian banks and broadly
comparable U.S. bank-holding companies (BHCs). They ﬁnd larger economies of scale for
Canadian banks than for the U.S. BHCs, which suggests that Canadian banks are less efﬁcient in
terms of scale, and have more to gain in terms of efﬁciency beneﬁts from becoming larger. Third,
the authors measure cost-inefﬁciency in Canadian banks and in U.S. BHCs relative to the
domestic efﬁcient frontier in each country (the domestic best-practice institution). They ﬁnd that
Canadian banks are closer to the domestic efﬁcient frontier than are the U.S. BHCs. Canadian
banks have also moved closer to the domestic efﬁcient frontier than have the U.S. BHCs over
time. Finally, the authors examine the dispersion in cost-inefﬁciency found in Canadian banks and
attribute some of the dispersion to differences in information and communication technology
investment. Comparisons are made with the U.S. BHC experience.
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, D24, C33
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions
Résumé
Les auteurs comparent l’évolution respective de l’efﬁcience des principales banques canadiennes
et de banques commerciales américaines au cours des 20 dernières années. Trois méthodes
d’évaluation sont retenues. Les auteurs examinent avec la première les grands ratios de rendement
et constatent que les banques canadiennes sont aussi productives que les américaines. Avec la
seconde, ils évaluent l’ampleur des économies d’échelle au sein des fonctions de production des
établissements canadiens et des sociétés de portefeuille bancaires américaines à peu près
comparables. L’analyse révèle l’existence d’économies d’échelle plus importantes au Canada
qu’aux États-Unis, ce qui donne à penser que les banques canadiennes sont de taille moins
efﬁciente que les sociétés américaines et qu’elles ont le plus à gagner d’une expansion. Avec la
troisième méthode, les auteurs mesurent l’efﬁcience coût des banques canadiennes et des sociétés
de l’échantillon américain par rapport à l’institution qui se situe à la frontière efﬁciente dans le
pays concerné (celle qui a les meilleures pratiques). Il ressort que les banques canadiennes sont
non seulement plus près de cette frontière que ne le sont les sociétés aux États-Unis, mais aussi
qu’elles s’en sont davantage rapprochées que ces dernières. Pour ﬁnir, s’intéressant à la dispersionvi
des écarts d’efﬁcience coût au Canada, les auteurs imputent une partie de celle-ci aux écarts
d’investissement existant dans le domaine des technologies de l’information et de la
communication. Ils comparent également avec la situation américaine.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G21, D24, C33
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières1 Introduction
The efﬁciency of the ﬁnancial system is important to the productivity and long-term growth of the
economy. An extensive survey of the literature by Dolar and Meh (2002) suggests that the quality of
ﬁnancial service provision is a key ingredient to economic growth. Banks play a vital role in the Cana-
dian ﬁnancial system, accounting for over 70 per cent of the total assets of the ﬁnancial services sector,
and providing over half of the short-term business credit in Canada.1 Accordingly, bank efﬁciency is
crucial to the sound functioning of the Canadian ﬁnancial system.
This paper focuses on Canada’s six largest banks, which account for over 90 per cent of the assets in
the Canadian banking sector. These Canadian banks are compared with two groups of U.S. banks: total
U.S. commercial banks and a subset of 12 large U.S. bank-holding companies (BHCs). The 12 BHCs
are selected from the top 20 BHCs in terms of assets; they are chosen because they have continuous
data from 1986 and a business mix broadly comparable with the Canadian banks in the sample. The
six large Canadian banks share more similarities with larger U.S. BHCs than with an average U.S.
bank. For example, they are all signiﬁcantly engaged in non-traditional businesses, such as investment
banking and wealth management.
Comparing Canadian banks with U.S. banks can provide insights for other countries. Canada’s
ﬁnancial system is more bank-based than the U.S. system, and many countries, including developing
countries, have a similar system. To some extent, one can consider this study as a comparison of
banks in different representative ﬁnancial systems, with most countries having more similarities with
the Canadian case than with the U.S. case.
We compare Canada–U.S. banking efﬁciency using several approaches. First, we directly compare
the efﬁciency of Canadian banks and U.S. banks through ratios related to bank efﬁciency and produc-
tivity. These ratios are commonly used to compare performance among banks and across time. We
ﬁnd that Canada–U.S. comparisons are sensitive to how nominal output is measured. In contrast, use
of different nominal output deﬂators does not lead to substantial differences.
Second, we measure economies of scale for our subset of banks in the two countries. If there are
economies of scale or diseconomies of scale in bank cost structures, then banks are not operating at
an efﬁcient scale; i.e., they are not at the minimum of the average cost curve. This paper extends
Allen and Liu (2005) by comparing results for Canada with those for major U.S. BHCs. Mester (1997)
arguesthataccountingforheterogeneityisimportantinstudiesusingthecost-efﬁciencyframework. We
therefore limit our sample selection to very large banks with diversiﬁed business lines. The literature
provides ample research that examines the economies of scale of smaller U.S. banks and ﬁnds moderate
1Department of Finance Canada, http://www.ﬁn.gc.ca/toce/2005/fact-cfsse.html
1economies of scale. See, for example, Ferrier and Lovell (1990) or Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a
literature review. However, we are unaware of any study that focuses on banks as large as the six major
Canadian banks and the U.S. BHCs in our study.2
The third approach we take is to examine the amount of cost-inefﬁciency of the banks in each
country. Cost-inefﬁciency is measured as a bank’s cost level compared with that of the “best-practice”
bank of similar size in each country (the efﬁcient-frontier ﬁrm), controlling for the type of banking
activities, the input prices it faces, and the technology with which banking inputs are transformed into
outputs.
The analytical framework used to measure economies of scale and cost-inefﬁciency is the translog
cost function. Banks are assumed to use labour, capital, and deposits to produce different types of loans
and non-traditional activities. Because of the long time dimension of the data and non-stationarities, we
estimate the translog cost function using a time-varying ﬁxed-effects model, including leads and lags of
the explanatory variables, known as panel dynamic ordinary least squares (PDOLS). Cost-inefﬁciency
is obtained from the residual term of the ﬁtted translog cost function. This exercise allows us to learn
about the size and dispersion of cost-inefﬁciency of the banks in each country and, given the long time
dimension of the data set, the evolution of that inefﬁciency.
The mean cost-inefﬁciency among Canadian banks is found to be about 10 per cent; that is, on av-
erage, Canadian banks are about 10 per cent less efﬁcient than the most efﬁcient domestic bank. For the
U.S. sample of comparable BHCs, mean cost-inefﬁciency is 16 per cent. This is higher than the 10 per
cent average cost-inefﬁciency estimated by Stiroh (2000) for a set of 661 BHCs over the period 1991–
97. A typical result in the literature, including U.S. banks, is a calculation of average cost-inefﬁciency
in the range of 15–20 per cent. These are relatively large cost-inefﬁciencies, suggesting that the return
to organizational change at the least efﬁcient banks to become more like the most efﬁcient bank is
high (Valverde et al. (2004)). Current research has looked at management styles, organizational struc-
ture, and technological investment to try to explain large estimated gaps in cost-efﬁciency. We focus
on information and communication technology (ICT) investment as one way to explain the Canadian
dispersion in cost-inefﬁciency. We focus on ICT investment because of the strong link made in the
literature between ICT and productivity (Crawford (2003)).
The various ﬁnancial ratios that we consider suggest that Canadian banks are at least as productive
and efﬁcient as U.S. banks, aside from having a higher expense/revenue ratio due to higher unit labour
costs. We also ﬁnd larger economies of scale in Canadian banks than in U.S. BHCs, which suggests that
Canadian banks are less efﬁcient in terms of scale. Controlling for economies of scale, large Canadian
banks also seem to rank higher in efﬁciency rankings, suggesting that there is extra beneﬁt from being
2There are studies that investigate separately banks of asset size of more than $1 billion. The smallest bank in both our
Canadian and U.S. samples has an asset size of more than $80 billion.
2bigger. We do not ﬁnd the same result for U.S. banks. Finally, we ﬁnd that Canadian banks are closer
to the domestic efﬁcient frontier than are the U.S. BHCs. As well, over time, Canadian banks have
moved closer to the domestic efﬁcient frontier than have their U.S. counterparts by a small margin; that
is, dispersion among Canadian bank cost-inefﬁciency has declined by more than in the U.S. sample.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Canadian and U.S.
banking industry, including a discussion of the evolution of the regulatory environment for banks in
both countries. Section 3 compares the performance of banks in both countries by looking at key ratios
related to efﬁciency and productivity. Section 4 considers economies of scale and cost-inefﬁciency
for the large Canadian banks and the U.S. BHCs. Section 5 focuses on reﬁning the estimation of the
cost functions, particularly on variables related to technological progress. Section 6 concludes with
suggestions for future research.
2 Industry Structure
The structures of Canadian and U.S. banking industries are substantially different. We are inter-
ested, therefore, in examining differences in efﬁciency of banks conditional on industry structure and
regulatory environments.
Historically, the structure of the Canadian banking industry was relatively stable. For instance,
from 1920 to 1980, Canada consistently had eleven banks (Bordo (1995)). By May 2005, however,
after several regulatory changes removing the sharp limits on the entry of foreign banks, there were
over 60 banks operating in Canada: 19 domestic banks, 23 foreign bank subsidiaries, and 21 foreign
bank branches. However, banking itself is relatively concentrated: the ﬁve largest banks hold close
to 90 per cent of total bank assets. Canadian banks also account for over 70 per cent of the assets of
the Canadian ﬁnancial services sector, which contributes over 6 per cent of Canada’s gross domestic
product (GDP).3 The total assets of Canadian banks amount to around $1.9 trillion, or close to 150
per cent of GDP. Canada’s chartered banks also contribute 25 per cent of total business credit in the
country.
In sharp contrast to the Canadian experience, and reﬂecting the relatively fragmented historical
context of U.S. banking, the number of U.S. commercial banks has declined sharply from around
14,000 banks in 1920 to about 8,000 in 2005–and the speed of this consolidation accelerated in the
late 1980s. The assets of the top ﬁve U.S. banks account for less than 30 per cent of total banking
assets in the United States. In addition, U.S. banks play a less important role in the country’s ﬁnancial
3By ﬁnancial sector we mean banks, credit unions, trust companies, life and health insurance, property & casualty insur-
ance, securities dealers, and ﬁnancing/leasing companies.
3system, which is more market-basedthan that in Canada. Forexample, U.S. banks account for a smaller
percentage of domestic business credit compared with Canadian banks. U.S. banks provide 7 per cent
of business credit. Total assets of U.S. commercial banks are US$8.4 trillion, or close to 75 per cent of
U.S. GDP.
2.1 Financial legislation and regulatory development
Important contributing factors to the striking difference in the structure of the banking industry
in the two countries – especially historically – are the legislative and regulatory environments. Bordo
(1995) argues that these features also determine the efﬁciency and stability of a banking system. Focus-
ing on the period 1920 to 1980, he argues that Canada had a more stable and efﬁcient banking system
than the United States. This is attributed largely to the prohibition of interstate (nationwide) branch
banking historically in the United States, which resulted in an inability to absorb major shocks without
bank failures. However, since 1980 – the period of interest in this paper – both countries have experi-
enced substantial changes in ﬁnancial legislation, which have correspondingly inﬂuenced the evolution
of their respective ﬁnancial services industries, and in a broadly convergent manner.
In Canada, prior to 1980, the ﬁnancial services industry had been segmented (by legislation, regu-
lation, and practice) into distinct “pillars”: commercial banking, trust business and residential lending,
insurance underwriting and brokerage, and securities underwriting and dealing. As well, prior to 1980
there were sharp limits on the entry of foreign banks into the Canadian market. However, in the past
25 years, with changes in both market practice and a series of revisions in the governing ﬁnancial leg-
islation, there have been signiﬁcant changes in the Canadian ﬁnancial services sector generally, and
in banking speciﬁcally. Key characteristics have been the entry of foreign banks and the expansion of
banks into a range of ﬁnancial services, including the trust business, insurance underwriting and sales
(although not through bank branches), and securities underwriting and dealing. And while consoli-
dation among various ﬁnancial services ﬁrms has accompanied these developments, there have been
no mergers among major Canadian banks themselves in years. For discussions of these and related
developments in Canada, see Daniel et al. (1992), Freedman (1998), and Engert et al. (1999).
Canadian banks are federally incorporated and regulated primarily under the federal Bank Act,
which deﬁnes their range of activities. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Canadian banks were never
prohibited from conducting nationwide branching and banking. An important element of the Bank
Act (and other federal ﬁnancial legislation) is a “sunset” clause, which requires a periodic review of
the legislation that governs Canadian ﬁnancial services. This formal review process led to signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial legislation amendments in 1980, 1987, 1992, and 1997, which have contributed to more di-
versiﬁed business lines and more market-oriented activities in Canadian banks. As will be seen later,
4the dates corresponding to some of these revisions are statistically signiﬁcant in explaining the decline
in banks’ total costs over the sample 1983 to 2004.
In 1987 federal legislation was amended to permit Canadian banks to invest in securities dealers.
All major banks subsequently made substantial investments in the securities business and purchased
control of most of the existing large investment dealers. The 1987 amendments also allowed ﬁnancial
intermediariestoconductbrokerageactivities. In1992, Canadianbanksweregiventherighttoenterthe
trust business through the establishment, or acquisition, of trust companies. Most trust companies were
subsequently purchased by Canada’s largest banks. The ﬁnancial difﬁculties that many trust companies
experienced following the collapse of the speculative real estate boom in the late 1980s contributed to
the ability of banks to acquire them. Also in 1992, banks were permitted to do in-house activities such
as portfolio management and investment advice. In 1997, new legislation included various changes to
update and revise the amendments made in 1992.
In contrast to Canada, the United States has had a dual system of banking in which some banks are
chartered and regulated by the states, and others are federally chartered and regulated. The relatively
large number of U.S. banks reﬂects a historical aversion in the United States to concentration of bank
wealth and inﬂuence, and is reﬂected in the 1927 McFadden Act, which explicitly prohibited interstate
branching. Despite the prohibition of interstate branching for individual banks, some institutions have
long been able to cross state boundaries via a BHC.
The BHC structure allows banks in different states to operate as separate subsidiaries of a parent
BHC. These institutions were not subject to substantial regulation until the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956. An important consequence of this Act was the effective elimination of interstate expansion,
except for single-bank BHCs. As a result, these single-bank BHCs grew rapidly in the 1960s. However,
this loophole was closed by the U.S. Congress in a 1970 amendment to the Bank Holding Company
Act.
During the 1970s and 1980s, as in Canada, technological innovation, economic shocks, and dereg-
ulation fundamentally altered the banking environment in the United States and the move towards
interstate and nationwide banking began in earnest. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) contributed to this trend by allowing BHCs to acquire savings and
loan companies, conditional on certain standards.
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efﬁciency Act (IBBEA) of 1994 completed the
consolidation trend by providing a consistent, national framework for interstate banking. Effective 29
September 1995, BHCs were allowed to acquire a bank in any state, and effective 1 June 1997, banks
were authorized to merge across state lines. As Holland et al. (1996) point out, however, the IBBEA
did not create interstate banking, but rather broadened the scope of the consolidation trends that were
5already taking place under the form of BHC ownership, which has become by far the most dominant
bank ownership structure in the United States.
In addition to interstate-banking restrictions, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 imposed a rigid separa-
tion between commercial banking and investment banking. Between 1963 and 1987, banks challenged
restrictions on their ability to underwrite securities such as municipal revenue bonds, commercial pa-
per, and mortgage-backed securities. In most cases, the courts eventually permitted these activities
for commercial banks. The U.S. Federal Reserve in April 1987 allowed BHCs to establish separate
Section 20 securities afﬁliates as investment banks. Under the Federal Reserve Board’s interpretation
of the law, these Section 20 subsidiaries did not violate Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act under
some conditions (most notably in that the revenue generated from the subsidiaries’ ineligible securities
activities amounted to no more than 5 per cent of the revenues they generated).
Theerosion ofthe Glass-SteagallAct continuedinto the1990s, andin 1997commercial banks were
allowed to directly acquire existing investment banks as Section 20 subsidiaries rather than establish
de novo Section 20 subsidiaries. Finally, in 1999, the U.S. Congress passed the Financial Services
Modernization Act which repealed the legal barriers between commercial banks, investment banks,
and insurance companies, allowing ﬁnancial institutions to engage in banking, securities, and insurance
activities.
3 Performance Ratios
Policy-makers are often interested in the performance of domestic industries relative to the perfor-
mance of similar industries in foreign countries. There is an interest in understanding the factors that
determine cross-country differences in productivity, so that policies can be implemented to improve the
overall standard of living in the domestic country. Also, ﬁnancial and industry analysts are interested
in productivity measures because an increase in productivity implies that a company or industry can
produce (and sell) a given quantity using fewer inputs.
Bank output is difﬁcult to measure, both as a conceptual and a practical matter.4 The System
of National Accounts (SNA), which is used to generate ofﬁcial statistics, deﬁnes bank output as net
interest income plus explicit service fees booked domestically. A major difﬁculty in this context lies
in providing for an accurate measure of net interest income. Ofﬁcial statistics calculate nominal output
as the sum of imputed interest plus service charges. Imputed interest is calculated by estimating a
representative interest margin for a given (predetermined) business line, and multiplying that margin by
4Measuring nominal output in all components of the National Accounts aggregation “Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate”
(FIRE) is inherently difﬁcult, since these industries are providing services and not producing goods. We focus on banking,
given its prominence and the detailed data set we have on the industry.
6the average annual balance outstanding for the business line. The accuracy of this approach to measure
bank value-added has been called into question by researchers (see, for example, Wang (2003), and
Triplett and Bosworth (2004)) as well as statistical agencies (see, for example, Dafﬁn et al. (2002)).
In addition, methodological differences among national statistical agencies’ national accounts further
complicate cross-country comparisons using such data.
This section compares the performance ratios of the six largest Canadian banks with a set of U.S.
BHCs and total U.S. banks using different data sources than the SNA. The six Canadian banks are:
Royal Bank Financial Group, Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, TD Bank
Financial Group, Bank of Nova Scotia, and National Bank. The 12 BHCs are JP Morgan Chase &
Co., Bank of America Corp., Wachovia Corp., Wells Fargo & Co., U.S. Bancorp, SunTrust Banks Inc.,
National City Corp., Citizens Financial Group Inc., BB&T Corp., Fifth Third Bancorp, Keycorp, and
PNC Financial Services Group Inc. The 12 BHCs are selected from the top 20 in terms of assets as
of 31 December 2004; they are chosen because they have continuous data from 1986 to 2004 and a
business mix broadly comparable with the Canadian banks in the sample.5 Table 8 in the appendix
presents summary statistics of the Canadian banks and the U.S. BHCs included in our sample.
The data set we use for these banks is balance-sheet and income-statement data as reported to the
supervisory authorities in Canada and the United States. To compare real output per country, we deﬂate
all variables by the consumer price index (CPI), excluding food and energy prices, in their respective
country. Rao et al. (2004) suggest, after detailed calculations, a purchasing power parity (PPP) measure
of 1.09 for bank value-added in 1999 for the FIRE industry in Canada. PPP is notoriously difﬁcult to
estimate; therefore, some caution should be exercised when interpreting cross-country comparisons of
performance ratios. We express all series in constant 1999 dollars and then apply a PPP measure of
1.09 to all Canadian series. For simplicity, we refer to constant 1999 U.S. dollars as “dollars” in the
rest of the text.
3.1 Expense ratio
The expense ratio, often referred to as the “efﬁciency ratio,” is commonly used by industry analysts
to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of banks. It is deﬁned as the ratio of non-interest expense to net
operating revenue (net interest income plus non-interest income).6 Figure 1 compares the expense
ratio of Canadian banks, the U.S. BHCs, and total U.S. banks. The expense ratio of Canadian banks
5We benchmark with reference to percentage of revenue from retail activities.That is, most of these BHCs have a similar
proportion of revenue from retail banking as the Canadian banks.
6The denominator of the expense ratio – the net interest margin – depends on the risk differential between assets and lia-
bilities. Accordingly, a change in the expense ratio can be due to changed risk-taking, and not necessarily changed efﬁciency.
Thus, we prefer the term “expense ratio” for this measure, not “efﬁciency ratio,” as it is sometimes called.
7was lower than those of their U.S. counterparts in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The expense ratio,
however, has been trending upwards in Canada and downwards in the United States over our sample
period. In 2005, it stood at 68 per cent for Canadian banks, and 62 per cent and 59 per cent for the U.S.
BHCs and total U.S. banks, respectively.
A breakdown of non-interest expenses provides a partial explanation for these trends. Figures 2
and 3 divide the expense ratio into the labour cost component and capital cost component, respectively.
As shown in Figure 2, the labour expense ratio in Canada has been higher than in U.S. banks in most of
the sample period. That ratio has been trending slightly upwards in Canadian banks, while decreasing
in U.S. BHCs and even more sharply in total U.S. banks. Similar trends are observed for the capital
cost expense ratio, where capital cost is non-interest expense net of labour cost. It includes mostly
physical capital expense in addition to administrative expenses. Canadian banks have a much lower
capital cost expense ratio than U.S. banks at the beginning of the sample. The difference narrows in the
mid-1990s, as capital prices, deﬁned as capital expenses on the stock of physical assets, increase more
signiﬁcantly in Canadian banks than in U.S. banks. The stronger increase in capital prices in Canadian
banks may be a result of increased competition in the adoption of new technology, a subject that will
be addressed further in Section 5. Overall, it seems that the difference in the expense ratios can be
currently attributed to a higher labour cost component at Canadian banks.
Given the higher labour cost of Canadian banks relative to U.S. banks, we ask whether Canadian
banks hire too many workers to produce the given amount of output, or pay their workers a premium.
Figure 4 shows the net operating revenue per employee for the three groups of banks – a measure
of labour productivity. The ratio for Canadian banks was lower than that of the U.S. banks in the
late 1980s, but started to catch up in the early 1990s. In fact, the measures for the three groups of
banks have converged since the late 1990s. Therefore, the current higher labour cost component in
Canadian banks must come from a higher unit wage. This is apparent in Figure 5. The annual wage
and beneﬁt per employee in Canadian banks is plotted against those of the U.S. BHCs and total U.S.
banks. Canadian banks compensated their average worker around 80,000 dollars in 2004, while the
U.S. BHCs compensation was close to 70,000 dollars, and an average U.S. bank compensation was
around 55,000 dollars.
Two important wage differentials should be noted here, where by “wage” we mean salaries and
beneﬁts. The ﬁrst is the difference between wages at the large banks (i.e., Canadian banks and U.S.
BHCs) and those at total U.S. banks, which signiﬁcantly arise only after 1993. This trend coincides
with the increase in market-based activities of the Canadian banks and BHCs in the early 1990s. This
increased wage differential may imply that the banks’ engagement in market-based activities has cre-
ated more high-paying positions, like investment bankers, advisers, and brokers, particularly in the bull
market of the 1990s.
8The second wage differential of note is between Canadian banks and the U.S. BHCs. Given that
both groups of banks have a similar business mix, the overall wage differential is unlikely to come from
the different skill sets employed by large banks in the two countries. While we do not have sufﬁcient
data to explain the apparent wage premium received by Canadian bankers, this wage differential itself
does not imply disparities in efﬁciency levels. Therefore, a perception that Canadian banks are less
efﬁcient than U.S. banks, which is based on the comparison of the expense ratio (Figure 1), can be
misleading. A more valid comparison should be based on other measures, such as those that consider
productivity more directly.
3.2 Productivity ratios
Another measure of efﬁciency is labour productivity, which is deﬁned as output per hour of labour
worked. A more productive bank can provide services in a more cost-effective way. Furthermore,
productivity gains of banks contribute signiﬁcantly to total productivity growth in the economy.
The measurement of banking output is a challenge and of constant debate, including at the National
Accounts level. The 1993 SNA recommends measuring nominal bank output by combining net interest
income with explicit services fees booked domestically. Both Canada and the United States use this
approach to measure nominal bank output in their respective National Accounts. Each country, how-
ever, uses a different method to measure the volume of bank output; that is, real output. In 1999, the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) adopted a quantity indicator of bank output developed by
the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) to track volumes of banking transactions, such as the number
of cheques written or the number of transactions on automated banking machines, to better capture
the growing number of transactions. In Canada, the volume of bank output is calculated by simply
deﬂating the nominal bank output measure by the aggregate consumer price index (CPI).
No known study has estimated the discrepancy created by the different methodologies adopted by
the two countries. Published National Accounts data allow us to compare the annual output and price
deﬂator for an aggregation of “monetary authorities and credit intermediaries” in the two countries
from 1997. Figure 6 shows the two price deﬂators used in the National Accounts measure of banking
output in Canada and the United States. If 1999 is used as the base year, then it is apparent that using
the speciﬁc “credit intermediation deﬂator” itself can imply higher banking output in the United States
relative to the methodology used in Canada.
Since a measure of the output of banks is not available from the National Accounts, we deﬁne
banking output in both countries as net operating revenue (net interest income plus non-interest income
9booked worldwide). In principle, this should be fairly close to the conceptual deﬁnition of nominal
banking output in the 1993 SNA, although our measure of output is on a consolidated, global basis.7
As noted earlier, to avoid a discrepancy created by the use of different deﬂators, we deﬂate our
measure of banking output by CPI excluding food and energy in both countries. Assuming a constant
number of hours in a work week, we compare the ratio of net operating revenue per full-time-equivalent
employee across the three groups of banks.
Again, Figure 4 shows the net operating revenue per full-time-equivalent employee in Canadian
banks, large U.S. BHCs, and total U.S. banks in constant 1999 U.S. dollars. According to this measure,
Canadian banking workers were less productive than U.S. banking workers in the late 1980s, but started
to catch up in the early 1990s. In fact, labour productivity in the three groups of banks has converged
since the late 1990s, suggesting that, currently, Canadian banks are as productive as their U.S. counter-
parts. Factors that may have contributed to such a catching-up of Canadian banks include their change
of business mix towards more market-oriented activities, and their investment in technology. We will
investigate the possibility of the latter in Section 5.
Figure 7 compares total assets per full-time-equivalent employee across Canadian banks, the U.S.
BHCs, and total U.S. banks. Total assets is the typical deﬁnition of bank output in econometric studies
of cost and proﬁt functions (see Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a review of the literature). Using
total assets as a measure of bank output, we calculate that a Canadian bank employee produced almost
40 per cent more assets than a U.S. bank employee in the past decade. The divergence also took place
in the early 1990s, consistent with our other measure of banking productivity. Based on this measure,
Canadian banks are much more productive than U.S. banks.
As was the case of using the expense ratio as a measure of efﬁciency, there are also challenges
inherent in using assets per employee as a measure of productivity. The decision of banks to have
loans, for example, on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet (via securitization) is an optimal response to
historical, institutional, and regulatory differences across countries. It is possible therefore that banks
use different approaches to generate similar proﬁts. Freedman and Engert (2003) discuss different
patterns of securitization in Canadian and U.S. banking, and reasons for these differences. The point is
clearest when comparing net operating revenues. Canadian and U.S. banks have similar net operating
revenues per employee, as shown in Figure 4.
7Wang (2003) takes a fundamentally different approach to measuring bank output. She develops a model of bank opera-
tions that excludes risk-related returns on borrowing and lending from the deﬁnition of value-added. This measure, however,
is not yet practical for making cross-country comparisons. Future work might beneﬁt from using Wang’s deﬁnition of banking
output to measure labour productivity, since it appears (at least conceptually) to be a truer measure of banking activity than
provided by National Accounts measures.
10Finally, for completeness, Figure 8 adds to total assets from Figure 7 a measure of off-balance-sheet
(OBS) assets. The value of OBS assets is estimated using the approach of Boyd and Gertler (1994),
explained below. Figures 7 and 8 suggest that Canadian banks are more productive than U.S. banks,
whether or not one includes OBS activities.
4 Measuring Economies of Scale and X-efﬁciency
AllenandLiu(2005)measureeconomiesofscaleandcost-efﬁciencyforCanada’ssixlargestbanks.
A multi-output translog cost function is estimated using quarterly data from 1983 to the third quarter
of 2003. In this paper, we apply the same framework to the group of 12 U.S. BHCs and re-estimate the
cost function for the large Canadian banks using data up to and including the fourth quarter of 2004.
4.1 Speciﬁcation and estimation
Banks in both countries are assumed to use three inputs (labour, capital, and deposits) and to pro-
duce ﬁve outputs (consumer loans, non-mortgage loans, mortgage loans, other ﬁnancial assets, and
non-traditional banking activities, including OBS) , each deﬁned in the appendix. This intermediation
approach of Sealey and Lindley (1997) is now standard in the banking literature.
We deﬁne bank output as the book value of total bank assets booked worldwide. This deﬁnition is
adopted in almost all empirical research on bank economies of scale and efﬁciency. This measure is
relatively easy to collect and there is little ambiguity in the deﬁnition. One problem with this measure,
however, is that non-traditional banking activities, especially those related to OBS activities, are not
captured. As a solution, Boyd and Gertler (1994) suggest generating a hypothetical portfolio that would
be required to generate non-interest income. We use this approach, with one caveat. The underlying
assumption required to construct the hypothetical portfolio is that off-balance-sheet assets yield the
same rate of return as on-balance-sheet assets. This ignores differences in risk. For robustness we
provide a range of estimates for economies of scale based on different assumptions regarding the return
to OBS activities.







































11where variables are in logarithms and certain restrictions apply: å
k
jbj = 1, å
k
jgl j = 0, and å
k
jdl j = 0
(homogeneity). Due to multicollinearity, we also impose sl j = 0. Variable cost is given by c, outputs
denoted by q, inputs denoted by w, exogenous variables denoted by G, the ﬁrm ﬁxed effect denoted
by e, and the error term denoted by x. Examples of G include, in the Canadian case, the 1987 and
1997 changes to the Bank Act (G1CAN and G3CAN, respectively) and the complete implementation of
the IBBEA in the United States by 1997 (G3US).















There are increasing returns to scale if z > 1, constant returns to scale if z = 1, and decreasing returns
to scale if z < 1.
To derive a measure of cost-efﬁciency, the cost frontier intercept is ﬁrst deﬁned as ˆ a0t = minj(ˆ xjt),
and inefﬁciency is given by ˆ eit = ˆ xit ¡ ˆ a0t. The time-invariant case is nested if the same ﬁrm is selected
for all t. Cost-efﬁciency is derived as:
CEit = expf¡ˆ eitg:
Estimationofcost-efﬁciencywiththetranslogcostfunctionisbasedontheerrortermfromequation
(1). Accordingly, reliableinferenceregardingcost-efﬁciencydependsonaccuratelyestimatingthecost-
function. To avoid confounding the estimates of cost-efﬁciency, information on Canadian banks and
U.S. BHCs is not pooled, but rather separate cost functions are estimated for each country. Given,
among other things, differences in institutional and regulatory environments, pooling the data would
reduce the accuracy of the parameter estimates and render the error term uninterpretable. The approach
we take is consistent with Mester (1997), who argues that, in estimating cost functions, the measure of
X-efﬁciency is sensitive to the amount of heterogeneity in the bank sample.
An additional parameter of interest is technology, which we proxy by a quadratic time trend. The
derivative of cost with respect to time is a measure of technological progress. Although interesting as
a ﬁrst step, we present alternatives in Section 5.
For robustness, we present two estimators. A ﬁxed-effects model is estimated by generalized least
squares and by panel dynamic ordinary least squares (PDOLS). Given the non-stationarity of the data,
however, the PDOLS estimator is the only one that gives consistent parameter estimates and correct
standard errors. Kao and Chaing (2000) also show, via Monte Carlo simulations, that PDOLS outper-
forms other similar estimators, such as bias-corrected least squares and fully-modiﬁed least squares.
12Allen and Liu (2005) show that the standard estimator, which ignores the non-stationarity of the data,
can substantially overestimate economies of scale. Consider a generic ﬁxed-effects model:
yit = X0
itb+xit +uit; (3)
where xit are the potentially time-varying ﬁxed effects and uit are the residuals. Assume that the re-
gressors follow a unit root process:
Xit = Xit¡1+nit:

























where zit is the 2£(q+1)£1 vector of regressors, zit = [xit ¡xi;Dxi;t¡q;:::;Dxi;t+q], ˜ yit = yit ¡yi, and
the subscript 1 on the outside brackets indicates that we take only the ﬁrst elements of the vector.
4.2 Results
Estimatesof economies of scalein Canada forthe period 1983 to2004 are presented inTable1. The
estimate of economies of scale is 6.2 per cent in “Model REG” and 8.2 per cent in “Model T”. Model
REG includes dummy variables to capture the effects of periodic regulatory changes in Canada, and
Model T includes a quadratic time trend to capture technological progress. The potential dummies for
regulatory changes, ﬁrst mentioned in Section 2.1, are: 1987Q2, 1989Q1, 1991Q1, 1992Q1, 1994Q1,
and 1997Q1. The dummies are zero before these dates, and one afterwards. Regulatory changes
that took place in 1987 and 1997 are statistically signiﬁcant. We also include a third speciﬁcation,
which includes both the regulatory dummies and time trend (REG+T). Parameter estimates for Model
REG+T are presented in the appendix in Table 9. In this case, economies of scale are approximately
7.1 per cent. In all cases, we reject constant returns to scale at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level.8 The
estimates of economies of scale are not statistically affected by our assumption regarding the return of
OBS activities.
8The parameters in this paper are estimated more precisely, given the extra data and the revisions, than in Allen and Liu
(2005), but are qualitatively the same.
13Table 1
Economies of Scale for Canadian Banks
Model z H0 : z = 1
Statistic P-value
Model REG 1.062 6.109 0.0134
Model T 1.082 10.36 0.0013
Model REG and T 1.071 7.922 0.0049
Note: The restriction imposed on equation (1) is actually z¡1 = 1
and åjdl j = 0 8 l, since returns to scale is deﬁned as ¶C
¶ql = ål al +
åådl jlog( ¯ Wj= ¯ W1) where ¯ ¢ is the sample mean.
In addition to economies of scale, we also ﬁnd a strong correlation between bank size and bank
efﬁciency, andrelativelylargecoefﬁcientsontechnologicalprogress(1.28percentperquarterinModel
T). Furthermore, the cost-efﬁciency gap between the most efﬁcient Canadian bank and the average
bank is approximately 10 per cent. Figure 9 shows the time-varying cost-efﬁciency measures for the
six Canadian banks in Model REG. Bank identities are not disclosed, for conﬁdentiality reasons. Time-
varying cost-efﬁciency is plotted relative to bank “B,” which is why the estimate can be greater than
one.
The same exercise is repeated for the 12 U.S. BHCs. Model REG includes regulatory dummy
variables. Four potential regulatory dates seem a priori important: 19872Q2, 1989Q1, 1997Q3, and
1999Q1. Statistically, the only signiﬁcant date is 1997Q3, and therefore we report only the estimation
results with a 1997Q3 dummy variable. Recall that, at the time, banks were ofﬁcially allowed to merge
across state lines. The second model (Model T) includes a quadratic time trend. The time trend is
statistically signiﬁcant. We also have a third model that combines both the regulatory dummy and the
time trend. Parameter estimates are presented in Table 9 in the appendix.
Similar to the Canadian case, the variables in the cost function for U.S. BHCs are found to be non-
stationary through unit root tests.9 By conducting unit root tests on the residuals from the cost function
(1), we do ﬁnd, however, that the cost function is co-integrated. Table 2 reports results for the null
hypothesis that the residuals of the cost-function for the U.S. BHCs are non-stationary. We report the
FishertestandmodiﬁedaugmentedDickey-Fullertest(MADF),introducedbyMaddalaandWu(1999)
and Sarno and Taylor (1998), respectively. The null hypothesis that all residuals are non-stationary is
rejected at the 5 per cent level.10
9Results are available upon request.
10The null hypothesis is set up such that if there are some residuals that are stationary, then the null hypothesis is rejected.
There is no clear approach to determine whether “some” means all or less than all.
14Table 2
Unit Root Tests on the U.S. BHC Cost Function Residuals
Fisher test MADF
Model BASE
Test statistic 38.31 70.25
P-value 0.032 0.000
Model REG
Test statistic 36.45 70.31
p-value 0.050 0.000
Model T
Test statistic 42.05 79.61
p-value 0.013 0.000
Model REG and T
Test statistic 45.24 82.18
p-value 0.006 0.000
Note: The Fisher test uses the least-squares estimator and an augmented Dickey-
Fuller test with four lags, and is distributed c2
12. Under the null hypothesis, each cross-
section is non-stationary. The MADF test also has a null hypothesis of non-stationarity.
Estimation is done using the seemingly unrelated regression estimator, and the distrib-
ution of the test statistic is achieved via simulation.
The data on U.S. BHCs are not as clean as those for Canadian banks. A reason for this is the
relatively large number of bank mergers in the sample, and, more speciﬁcally, how banks treat them
in their quarterly reports. A BHC can either account for the acquisition as a purchase or as a pooling
of interests. In the former case, BHCs report a large increase in cost due to the merger followed
by a sharp decrease in cost when operations are back to “normal.” Data reporting when banks pool
interests is more complicated. Rather than report large changes in reported variables, BHCs typically
spread the gains and the large costs of a merger over what is potentially several years. This reporting
scheme allows researchers to examine banks without structural breaks in the data.11 Most mergers are
treated as pooling of interests and therefore the balance-sheet data are smoothed over the period of
the merger. There are, however, some episodes where purchases result in excess volatility of balance-
sheet items. These changes in balance-sheet items are removed from the regression analysis by using
dummy variables.12 Speciﬁcally, we remove (i) 1998 for Bank of America, since that coincided with
11A detailed breakdown of mergers/acquisitions for BHCs can be provided upon request.
12Focarelli and Panetta (2003) ﬁnd that there are long-term efﬁciency gains from mergers and acquisitions using Italian
bank deposit data. Panetta et al. (2005), using the same Italian data set, ﬁnd further that informational beneﬁts, which reduce
costs, arise from mergers and acquisitions. Cost savings are related to informational processing. In a review of case studies,
Rhoades (1998) reports that four out of nine mergers in the United States resulted in cost-efﬁciency gains, while ﬁve mergers
15the purchase of Barnett Bank Inc; (ii) 1999 and 2001 for Fifth Third, to account for the purchase of
PeoplesBankCorporationofIndianapolis, andacquisitionsin2001accountingfor$25billioninassets;
and (iii) 2000 for Wachovia, to account for the purchase of Everen.13
Results on economies of scale for the U.S. case are presented in Table 3. The null hypothesis
of constant returns to scale is rejected. Evaluated at the sample mean, the measured economies of
scale are 7.5 per cent for Model REG and 2.4 per cent for Model T. The model that combines both
the regulatory dummy variable and the time trend also produces an economy-of-scale measure that is
signiﬁcantly different from zero, approximately 2.2 per cent.14
We also consider the sensitivity of these results to different assumptions regarding the return asso-
ciated with OBS activities. The measure developed by Boyd and Gertler (1994) necessarily assumes
that the return on assets for OBS activities is the same as for on-balance-sheet activities. This is a
natural assumption regarding the portfolio of banks, but does ignore risk. With respect to the estimate
of economies of scale, this assumption turns out to be innocuous. We consider the effect of increasing
the return on assets for OBS activities by 5 to 10 percentage points; the effect is marginal and not
statistically signiﬁcant.
In addition to measuring economies of scale, we report measures of cost-efﬁciency. The time-
invariant measures of cost-efﬁciency are given in Table 4. Wells Fargo is consistently the most cost-
efﬁcient bank across models. Other banks that are fairly close include National City and U.S. Bancorp.
The identity of the least cost-efﬁcient bank depends on the model. Consistently poor performers,
however, include Citizens Bank and Fifth Third.
The time-varying measures of cost-efﬁciency are presented graphically in Figure 10. Most of the
BHCs are at least 10 per cent less efﬁcient than the frontier bank. Furthermore, the gap between the
most cost-efﬁcient bank, Wells Fargo, and the other banks appears to have been increasing over time.15
Indeed, several banks were more cost-efﬁcient than Wells Fargo at the beginning of the sample.
In addition, for Model T, the measure of technological progress is estimated to be approximately
0.26–0.29 per cent per quarter. This is substantially less than for Canadian banks, which is estimated
were not cost-efﬁcient. Rather than perform case studies of each merger, we smooth the data or remove volatile periods
caused by a merger or acquisition.
13Obviously, there is some subjectivity regarding which episodes to remove from the regression analysis. However, results
are robust to different speciﬁcations related to mergers and acquisitions. A detailed list of bank merger activity from 1980 to
1998 is provided by Rhoades (2000).
14The estimates for economies of scale are slightly larger if purchase-type mergers/acquisitions are not treated properly.
The differences, however, are small.
15Berger and Mester (2003) ﬁnd that the cost-efﬁciency of U.S. banks decreased over the period 1991–97. They also ﬁnd
that proﬁt efﬁciency improved in that period, and argue that banks provided better quality of service at a higher cost but raised
revenue by more than the cost increase. While we are aware of the advantages of estimating a proﬁt function, it would be
hard to justify the use of the DOLS estimator, which would suggest a non-zero proﬁt in the long run.
16to be approximately 1.28 per cent per quarter. We examine technological progress more closely in the
following section.
As another robustness check, we compare the estimates for ordinary least squares to dynamic least
squares for the 12 U.S. BHCs in the sample. Allen and Liu (2005) compare estimates of economies of
scale for the Canadian banks using the standard least squares estimator (which ignores non-stationarity)
tothedynamicleast-squaresestimatorand, asstatedearlier, ﬁndsubstantialbiasintheformerestimator.
For example, in a Canadian-bank cost function with regulatory dummies, the least-squares estimate
of economies of scale is close to 20 per cent, whereas if one uses the correct dynamic least-squares
estimator, the estimate is approximately 6.2 per cent. Phillips and Moon (1999) suggest that as the
number of cross-sectional observations increases, the noise in the cross-section should attenuate the
persistence in the time series. That is, the least-squares estimate should become “better” as the number
of cross-sectional observations increases. It is an open question as to the ﬁnite sample properties of
panel least squares in the presence of non-stationarity.
We ﬁnd that for the sample of U.S. BHCs the bias of the ordinary least squares estimate of
economies of scale is negligible and the cost-efﬁciency rankings are only marginally affected. It may
therefore be sufﬁcient to use the standard estimator for even moderate sample sizes, as in the case of
the U.S. BHCs. One would not want to use the PDOLS estimator for smaller sample sizes, as in the
case of Canadian banks.
Table 3
Economies of Scale for U.S. BHCs
Model z H0 : z = 1
Statistic P-value
Model REG 1.075 89.04 0.0000
Model T 1.024 9.307 0.0023
Model REG and T 1.022 8.715 0.0032
Note: The restriction imposed on equation (1) is actually z¡1 = 1
and åjdl j = 0 8 l, since returns to scale is deﬁned as ¶C
¶ql = ål al +
åådl jlog( ¯ Wj= ¯ W1) where ¯ ¢ is the sample mean.
So far, we have shown, using the translog cost function, that: economies of scale are larger in
the Canadian sample relative to the U.S. sample; average cost-inefﬁciency is lower in the Canadian
sample; and the time trend, which proxies technological progress, is four times larger in the Canadian
sample relative to the U.S. sample.16 A natural question is whether banks in the respective countries
16Research on productivity growth in FIRE (for example, by Tang and Wang (2004)) also suggests that such growth has
been larger in Canada than in the United States, although not by a large margin.
17Table 4
Cost-Efﬁciency for U.S. BHCs
Bank Cost-Efﬁciency
Model REG Model T Model REG and T
Wells Fargo 100 100 100
National City 89.4 93.0 92.7
U.S. Bancorp 88.3 89.9 89.3
Keycorp 85.9 88.9 88.8
BB&T Corp. 79.3 87.4 87.84
SunTrust 87.7 87.9 87.83
Wachovia 89.8 86.8 86.6
PNC Financial 83.5 84.6 84.2
Citizens Bank 73.1 82.4 83.2
Fifth Third 73.6 82.1 81.8
Bank of America 85.0 81.9 81.5
JP Morgan Chase 87.1 80.4 79.5
Note: The most efﬁcient bank has a ranking of 100 per cent and the cost-
efﬁciency of other banks is relative to that bank.
face different cost structures that could lead to different rates of technological progress. Figures 11 and
12 show cross-sectional averages of the cost breakdown (capital, labour, and deposits) for Canadian
banks and U.S. BHCs, respectively. The cost structures appear to be similar, with Canadian banks
experiencing a slightly higher cost of deposits for most of the sample. Given the similarity between
cost structures across countries, we consider more closely the substantially larger rate of technological
progress estimated for Canadian banks. The model attributes most of the increase in Canada’s relative
productivity (Figure 8) to faster technological progress in Canada.
5 Capturing the Canadian Time Trend
Thus far, we have proxied technological progress using a quadratic time variable and ﬁnd that
technological progress is approximately 1.28 per cent per quarter for Canada’s banks, and between
0.26 and 0.29 per cent per quarter for the U.S. BHCs. In this section, we consider several explana-
tory variables that help explain within-Canada technological progress, and provide some intuition for
between-country differences.
The average cost-inefﬁciency in the Canadian banking sector is roughly 10 per cent, and in the
United States it is about 16 per cent, after controlling for size, factor inputs, output composition, and
the regulatory environment. These are relatively large cost-inefﬁciencies, suggesting that the return
18to organizational change at the least efﬁcient banks to become like the most efﬁcient bank is high
(Valverde et al. (2004)).
We examine whether ICT investments made by Canadian banks can explain the dispersion in cost-
efﬁciency. A review of the literature suggests that productivity growth and ICT investment are tightly
linked (Crawford (2003)). For example, Stiroh (2002) ﬁnds a strong correlation between ICT invest-
ments and the post-1995 productivity revival in the United States. Financial intermediation is an in-
formation technology-intensive industry, with front-ofﬁce operations such as branch, telephone, and
Internet banking, and back-ofﬁce operations such as payments clearing and settlement. Accordingly,
banks use advances in technology to cut costs and increase revenues. ICT can raise productivity by
improving information processing and delivery, and by improving the quality and range of products
offered (Berger (2003)). ICT investments, therefore, can increase productivity and improve the cost-
efﬁciency of the banking industry. Anecdotal evidence provided during interviews with Canada’s large
banks suggests that ICT investments are largely made for cost-efﬁciency reasons. The impact on pro-
ductivity of these investments is claimed to be substantial. Quantifying the impact of ICT investment
in a service industry such as banking is, however, difﬁcult.
Figure 9 presents the time-varying cost-efﬁciency measures of Canada ﬁt to a fourth-order time
polynomial of Model REG. Furthermore, if we include the time trend explicitly in the cost function,
the average cost-inefﬁciency is small relative to what is reported in the literature and relative to a
model without the time trend. Very little understanding of banks, however, is obtained by simply
using time trends. Instead, we want to consider measurable advances in technology. Our measure of
technological progress therefore should capture the movements of cost-efﬁciency over time, as well as
have an economic interpretation. In the results reported in this section, therefore, we do not include the
time trend.
Canadian banks, unlike their U.S. counterparts, have for the past 20 years reported consolidated
expenditures on “computers and equipment.” This includes depreciation of computers and equipment,
maintenance, equipment purchases, software, and network costs. We include in the cost-function es-
timation of Model REG the log of the ratio of technology expenditures to the capital stock (ITK).
The notion is that if, over time, banks have more heavily invested in new technology (which is more
cost-efﬁcient than older technologies), then costs should fall in the long run. The contemporaneous
coefﬁcient is, however, small (-0.013) and not statistically signiﬁcant.
In addition to considering the contemporaneous effect of IT investment, we look at lagged effects.
IT executives of the big Canadian banks suggest that there is typically a lag between implementing new
technology and reaping productivity gains from the new technology. Leung (2004) provides empirical
evidence of this phenomena for Canadian ﬁrms. We therefore include four lags of the ITK ratio in
the cost function. Results are reported in Table 5. The results are consistent with the anecdotal evi-
19dence. That is, at short lags an investment in technology is correlated with higher costs (although not
statistically signiﬁcant), and at longer lags it is correlated with lower costs.
Table 5
IT Investment
ITK Coefﬁcient Standard error
t ¡1 0.0374 0.0229
t ¡2 0.0102 0.0236
t ¡3 -0.0607† 0.0231
t ¡4 -0.0271 0.0215
Note: Estimates are for Model REG. † is signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level.
Given that measured investment in new technology is not substantially signiﬁcant, we consider
some other reasonable proxies for technological change. Results are collected in Table 6. For exam-
ple, we proxy banks’ effective adoption of technology using expenditures on employee training. New
technology requires new training, and the better the training the larger should be the gains of adoption.
Adding training expenditures on employees has two effects on the estimation of the cost function. First,
it can partially capture movements previously captured by the quadratic time trend. Secondly, training
expenditures can partially explain the cost-inefﬁciency differences between Canadian banks. The mean
cost-inefﬁciency drops from 7.3 per cent to 6.4 per cent.
Nextweconsiderthenumberofautomatedbankingmachines(ABM)pernumberofbankbranches.
Data for Canada are reported annually in the bank annual reports. This ratio in Canada has increased
from an average of 0.2 in 1985 to over 2 in 2004. ABMs are a low-cost distribution channel compared
with brick-and-mortar branches. Assuming that two banks have the same number of customers, the
bank that has the largest ABM network should have a higher proportion of customers using ABMs. The
bank with a high ratio of ABMs to branches, therefore, should be more cost-effective. Humphrey et al.
(2006) ﬁnd substantial cost-savings in a sample of 12 European countries from investments in ABMs
relative to branches. On the other hand, Bernhardt and Massoud (2002) show that there could be an
overprovision of ABMs, which would reduce bank proﬁtability. Stavins (2000) documents that there
have been very little cost-savings gained by U.S. banks by expanding their ABM network. Consumers
have simply responded to the increased convenience of ABMs by increasing their overall number of
transactions. We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on the number of ABMs per bank branch is negative (-0.064)
and signiﬁcantly different from zero. This implies that a 1 per cent increase in ABMs relative to bank
branches decreases bank costs over the sample period by 6.4 per cent. Including the number of ABMs
per branch also reduces the amount of unexplained technological progress attributed to the time trend
in the model. It was previously 1.28 per cent and is now 1.04 per cent. Finally, the number of ABMs
20per branch can also reduce the estimate of the cost-inefﬁciency differences across Canadian banks.17
The average cost-inefﬁciency falls from 7.33 per cent to 6.66 per cent.
Table 6
Average Cost-Inefﬁciency for Canadian Banks
Model Average cost-inefﬁciency (%)
Base 10.02
Regulatory dummies 7.32
Regulatory dummies and time trend 4.36
Regulatory dummies and training 6.36
Regulatory dummies and ABM per branch 6.66
Note: The “Base” model does not include any regulatory variable or time trend.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines banking efﬁciency for Canada and the United States in three ways. First,
we compare key performance ratios, and ﬁnd that Canadian banks are as productive as U.S. banks.
Second, we investigate whether there are economies of scale in the production functions of Canadian
banks and comparable U.S. bank-holding companies (BHCs). We ﬁnd larger economies of scale for
Canadian banks than for U.S. BHCs, which suggests that Canadian banks are less efﬁcient in terms of
scale, and have more to gain in terms of efﬁciency beneﬁts from becoming larger. Third, we measure
cost-inefﬁciency in Canadian banks and in U.S. BHCs relative to the domestic efﬁcient frontier in each
country (the domestic best-practice institution). We ﬁnd that Canadian banks are closer to the domestic
efﬁcient frontier and relatively close to each other in terms of cost-efﬁciency – closer than the U.S.
BHCs.
Finally, how can one interpret the large estimate of technological progress for Canadian banks
relative to the U.S. BHCs? In Canada, the estimate of technological progress is 1.04 per cent in the
most detailed model. The comparable estimate for the U.S. is 0.3 per cent, substantially lower than
in Canada. It is possible that the trend is capturing a substantial increase in total assets per labour
input for Canadian banks over the sample period, evident in Figure 8. As well, the time trend might
be capturing improvements in Canada’s payments system, including the establishment of an efﬁcient
large-value payments system in the late 1990s. In this regard, for example, Milne (2006) provides a
17We ﬁnd in analyzing the U.S. BHC experience from 1995 to 2004 a negative but not statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on
the ratio of ABMs to branches. Annual data are reported for U.S. banks either in their annual reports or 10K forms required
at the Securities and Exchange Commission. The reporting of the size of a bank’s ABM network is rather poor, which is the
reason for the small sample size and why we do not put much weight in the result.
21theoretical model to explain the empirical observation that countries with higher banking concentration
(such as Canada) have more efﬁcient payments systems. These and other possibilities might explain
the substantial measure of trend progress in the cost function. Given the current lack of relevant data,
but the increasing amount of data collection, it is hoped that these questions can be addressed in future
research.
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Y1 Consumer loans Dollar value of personal loans for non-business purposes
Y2 Non-mortgage loans Dollar value of secured call and other loans to investment
dealers and brokers + loans to regulated ﬁnancial institutions
+ loans to domestic and foreign governments + lease
receivables + reverse repurchase agreements + loans
to individuals and others for business purposes
Y3 Mortgage loans Dollar value of residential and non-residential mortgage loans
Y4 Other Dollar value of other ﬁnancial assets on a bank’s balance sheet
Y5 OBS Asset-equivalent measure of off-balance-sheet activities
L Price of labour Total salaries, pensions, and other staff beneﬁts divided by the
number of full-time-equivalent employees and hours in a year
K Price of capital Rental expense on real estate and depreciation on premises,
furniture, ﬁxture, computer and equipment divided by total stock of land,
buildings, and equipment, less accumulated depreciation
D Price of deposits Total interest expense on deposits divided by the total dollar
amount of deposits
C Total costs Interest cost + labour expenses + capital costs
26Appendix: Tables
Table 8
Summary Statistics of Large Canadian Banks and U.S. BHCs
Bank Total asset Percentage of revenue Number of service Number of province
from retail banking delivery units or state operating
Canadian banks (millions of C$)
Royal Bank 451.4 48 2084 10
TD Canada Trust 311.0 50 1290 10
Bank of Nova Scotia 279.2 42 1871 10
CIBC 278.8 44.5 1073 10
Bank of Montreal 265.2 42.5 1174 10
National Bank 88.8 47 462 10
U.S. BHCs (millions of US$)
JP Morgan Chase 1157.2 24 2508 17
Bank of America 1112.0 54 5889 29
Wachovia 493.3 45 3604 49
Wells Fargo 427.8 60 6046 50
U.S. Bancorp 195.1 42 2370 24
SunTrust 159.1 45 1710 9
National City 139.3 69 1650 43
Citizens Bank 136.8 61 1613 13
BB&T Corp. 100.5 77 1413 20
Fifth Third 94.5 51 1011 9
Keycorp 90.7 37 940 45
PNC Financial 79.7 40 875 36
Note: Based on 2004 annual reports. Retail banking refers primarily to deposit and loan services to individuals and small busi-
nesses. Non-retail banking includes wealth management, investment banking, insurance, brokerage, corporate lending, etc. Service
delivery units include branches and client service centres.
27Table 9
DOLS: Model REG + T
Canada United States
Variable Coefﬁcient T-statistic Coefﬁcient T-statistic
q1 -0.01291 -0.00291
q2 0.000075 -0.000022
G1CAN -0.03010¤¤ 3.396 – –
G3CAN -0.08245¤¤ 8.279 – –
G3US – – -0.02123¤ 2.224
a1 1.48064¤¤ 3.006 0.46124¤¤ 8.314
a2 3.19045¤¤ 7.600 0.23874¤¤ 4.264
a3 -2.01638¤¤ 5.576 0.29250¤¤ 4.993
a4 -0.99546¤ 2.013 0.06982 1.253
a5 0.44801¤ 1.931 0.35296¤¤ 6.526
b2 7.62442¤¤ 10.701 -0.86630¤¤ 4.890
b3 -2.14519¤ 2.145 1.28352¤¤ 4.992
d12 0.37314¤¤ 8.240 -0.06397¤ 2.012
d13 -0.23642¤¤ 12.934 -0.04440¤ 2.175
d23 0.04150¤ 2.029 -0.08306¤¤ 4.132
g12 -0.10954¤¤ 2.706 -0.02290¤¤ 4.367
g13 0.04102¤ 1.919 0.05888¤¤ 4.106
g22 -0.25280¤¤ 7.304 0.00923¤ 1.720
g23 0.02299† 1.384 0.07377¤¤ 5.121
g32 0.17858¤¤ 6.015 -0.00054 0.101
g33 -0.09905¤¤ 4.816 -0.02692¤¤ 2.372
g42 0.09591¤ 2.309 0.024700¤¤ 4.534
g43 -0.06914¤¤ 3.550 0.01993† 1.372
g52 -0.00779 0.418 -0.04131¤¤ 7.883
g53 0.13484¤¤ 12.093 -0.09494¤¤ 6.785
Note: ¤¤, ¤, †: signiﬁcant at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
The T-statistic is for the null hypothesis that the parameter is zero and is de-
ﬁned as: T ¡stat =
p
N(T¡lags¡leads¡1) ˆ Q
sqrt(VAR( ˆ Q)) where ˆ Q is the vector of parameter
estimates.
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